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1. Abstract
Decision-theoretic agents predict and evaluate the results of their actions using
a model, or ontology, of their environment. An agent’s goal, or utility function,
may also be specified in terms of the states of, or entities within, its ontology. If
the agent may upgrade or replace its ontology, it faces a crisis: the agent’s original
goal may not be well-defined with respect to its new ontology. This crisis must be
resolved before the agent can make plans towards achieving its goals.
We discuss in this paper which sorts of agents will undergo ontological crises
and why we may want to create such agents. We present some concrete examples,
and argue that a well-defined procedure for resolving ontological crises is needed.
We point to some possible approaches to solving this problem, and evaluate these
methods on our examples.
2. Introduction: Goals and Utility Functions
An agent is any person or thing that performs actions in order to achieve a
goal. These goals may involve anything of which the agent is aware, from its own
inputs and outputs to distant physical objects. When creating an artificial agent,
it is natural to be interested in which goals we choose to give it. When we create
something, we usually do so because we expect it to be useful to us. Thus the goals
we give to artificial agents should be things that we want to see accomplished.
Programmers of artificial agents are then faced with the task of specifying a goal.
In our discussion we assume that goals take the form of utility functions defined on
the set of possible states within the agent’s ontology. If a programmer is specifying
a utility function ”by hand” – that is, by looking at the ontology and directly as-
signing utilities to different states – then the ontology must be comprehensible to
the programmer. This will typically be the case for an ontology that the program-
mer has designed, but not necessarily so for one that an agent has learned from
experience.
An agent with a fixed ontology is not a very powerful agent, so we would like to
discuss an agent that begins with an ontology that its programmers understand and
have specified a utility function over, and then upgrades or replaces its ontology.
If the agent’s utility function is defined in terms of states of, or objects within, its
initial ontology, then it cannot evaluate utilities within its new ontology unless it
translates its utility function somehow.
Consider, for example, an agent schooled in classical physics. Perhaps this agent
has a goal that is easy to specify in terms of the movement of atoms, such as to
maintain a particular temperature within a given region of space. If we replace our
agent’s ontology with a quantum one, it is no longer obvious how the agent should
evaluate the desirability of a given state. If its utility function is determined by
temperature, and temperature is determined by the movement of atoms, then the
agent’s utility function is determined by the movement of atoms. Yet in a quantum
worldview, atoms are not clearly-defined objects. Atoms are not even fundamental
to a quantum worldview, so the agent’s ontology may contain no reference to atoms
whatsoever. How then, can the agent define its utility function?
One way to sidestep the problem of ontological crises is to define the agent’s
utility function entirely in terms of its percepts, as the set of possible percept-
sequences is one aspect of the agent’s ontology that does not change. Marcus
Hutter’s universal agent AIXI [1] uses this approach, and always tries to maximize
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the values in its reward channel. Humans and other animals partially rely on a
similar sort of reinforcement learning, but not entirely so.
We find the reinforcement learning approach unsatisfactory. As builders of ar-
tificial agents, we care about the changes to the environment that the agent will
effect; any reward signal that the agent processes is only a proxy for these external
changes. We would like to encode this information directly into the agent’s utility
function, rather than in an external system that the agent may seek to manipulate.
3. Our Approach
We will approach this problem from the perspective of concrete, comprehensible
ontologies. An AI programmer may specify an ontology by hand, and then specify
a utility function for that ontology. We will then try to devise a systematic way to
translate this utility function to different ontologies.
When using this method in practice, we might expect the agent to have a prob-
ability distribution over many ontologies, perhaps specified concisely by the pro-
grammer as members of a parametric family. The programmer would specify a
utility function on some concrete ontology which would be automatically trans-
lated to all other ontologies before the agent is turned on. In this way the agent
has a complete utility function.
However, for the purposes of this discussion, we may imagine that the agent has
only two ontologies, one old and one new, which we may call O0 and O1. The
agent’s utility function is defined in terms of states of O0, but it now believes O1 to
be a more accurate model of its environment. The agent now faces an ontological
crisis – the problem of translating its utility function to the new ontology O1.
In this paper we will present a method for addressing these problems. Our
intention, however, is not to close the book on ontological crises, but rather to open
it. Our method is of an ad-hoc character and only defined for a certain class of
ontologies. Furthermore it is not computationally tractable for large ontologies.
We hope that this discussion will inspire other thinkers to consider the problem of
ontological crises and develop new solutions.
4. Finite State Models
We wil nowl consider a specific kind of ontology, which we may call a finite state
model. These models have some finite set of possible hidden states, which the agent
does not directly observe. On each time step, the model inputs some symbol (the
agent’s output), enters some hidden state, and outputs some symbol (the agent’s
input). The model’s output depends (stochastically) only on its current state, while
its state depends (stochastically) on both the input and the previous state.
State State State
MotorMotor Motor
Sensor Sensor Sensor
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Let us call the agent’s output symbols motor symbols and the agent’s input
symbols sensor symbols. We will call the sets of symbols the motor alphabet and the
sensor alphabet, denoted M and S respectively. We will assume that the alphabets
are fixed properties of our agent’s embodiment; we will not consider models with
different alphabets.
Let m = |M | and s = |S|. Then a model with n states may be completely
specified by m different n× n transition matrices and one s× n output matrix.
For each x ∈ M , let us call the state transition matrix T x. Note that the
superscript here is not an exponent. We may call the output probability matrix A.
Since we will be speaking of two ontologies, O0 and O1, we will use subscripts to
indicate which ontology we are taking these matrices from; for instance, T x0 is the
state transition matrix for action x in the O0 ontology.
5. Maps between Ontologies
Our basic approach to translating our utility function from O0 to O1 will be
to construct a function from O1 to O0 and compose our utility function with this
function. If
(1) U : O0 → R
is a utility function defined on O0, and φ : O1 → O0, then U ◦ φ is a utility
function defined on O1.
The function φ we will seek to define will be a stochastic function; its output will
not be a single state within O0, but a probability distribution over states. Thus if
O0 has n0 states while O1 has n1 states, φ will be most naturally expressed as an
n0 × n1 matrix.
Let us consider some desiderata for φ:
1. φ should be determined by the structure of the models O0 and O1; the way
in which the states are labeled is irrelevant.
2. If O0 and O1 are isomorphic to each other, then φ should be an isomorphism.
This may seem irrelevant, for if O1 is isomorphic to O0, then there is no need to
change models at all. Nevertheless, few would object to 2 on grounds other than
irrelevance, and 2 may be seen as a special case of a more general statement:
3. If O0 and O1 are nearly isomorphic to each other, then φ should nearly be an
isomorphism.
This criterion is certainly relevant; since O0 and O1 are both models of the same
reality, they can be expected to be similar to that reality, and thus similar to each
other.
In accordance with these desiderata, we will try to construct a function that
is as much like an isomorphism as possible. To accomplish this, we will define in
quantitative terms what we mean by ”like an isomorphism.” First, we observe that
isomorphisms are invertible functions; thus, we will define a second function, which
we fancifully call φ−1 : O0 → O1, even though it may not be a true inverse of φ,
and we will optimize both φ and φ−1 to be ”like isomorphisms”.
Our criterion is a combination of the computer science notion of bisimulation
with the information-theoretic idea of Kullback-Leibler divergence.
Bisimulation means that either model may be used to simulate the other, using
φ and φ−1 to translate states between models. Thus, for any action x, we would
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like φ−1 ◦ T x0 ◦ φ to approximate T x1 . By this we mean that we should be able to
predict as accurately as possible the result of some action x in O1 by translating our
distribution for the initial state in O1 to a distribution over O0 (using the function
φ), predicting the result of action x within O0, and translating this result back to
O1 using φ
−1. Similarly, we would like to use O1 to predict the behavior of O0.
Furthermore, we want to to optimize φ and φ−1 so that both models will make
similar predictions about sensory data. Thus A0 ◦ φ should be close to A1 and
A1 ◦ φ−1 should be close to A0.
To measure distance between two matrices, we treat the columns vectors as prob-
ability distributions and sum the Kullback-Leibler divergences of the columns. For
two matrices P and Q, let DKL(P ||Q) be the sum of the Kullback-Leibler diver-
gences of the columns. When calculating Kullback-Leibler divergence, we consider
the columns of the A and T matrices to be the ”true” distributions, while those
depending on φ or φ−1 are regarded as the approximations.
So we choose φ and φ−1 to minimize the quantity(∑
x∈M
DKL(T
x
1 ||φ−1T x0 φ)
)
+DKL(A1||φ−1A0φ)
+
(∑
x∈M
DKL(T
x
0 ||φT x1 φ−1)
)
+DKL(A0||φA1φ−1)
Using a simple hill-climbing algorithm, we have tested our criterion on a simple
example.
6. Example: the long corridor
The agent initially believes that it is standing in a corridor consisting of four
discrete locations. The agent’s actions are to move left or right. If the agent is
already at the end of the corridor and attempts to move further in that direction,
it will remain where it is. The agent can see whether it standing at the left end,
the right end, or at neither end of the corridor. The agent’s goal is to stand at the
right end of the corridor.
Left arrows indicate “move left” action
Right arrows indicate “move right” action
States {
Utility
Sensor Readings “Left” “Middle” “Right”
0 1
Now the agent discovers that this ontology is incorrect; the corridor actually
consists of five discrete locations. What, then, should the agent do? Intuitively, it
seems most plausible that the agent should stand at the right end of the corridor.
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Stretching plausibility a bit, perhaps the agent should stand one step away from
the right end of the corridor, since the corridor is longer than expected. Any other
solution seems counterintuitive.
Our initial, four-state ontology O0 can be represented in matrix form as follows:
(2) TL0 =

1 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0
 , TR0 =

0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 1
A0 =
 1 0 0 00 1 1 0
0 0 0 1

And the five-state ontology O1 can be represented as:
(3)
TL1 =

1 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0
 , TR1 =

0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 1
A1 =
 1 0 0 0 00 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 1

By hill-climbing from random initial values, our program found several local
optima. After 10 runs, our best result, to three significant figures, was:
(4) φ =

1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0.503 0 0
0 0 0.496 1 0
0 0 0 0 1
 , φ−1 =

1 0.014 0.001 0
0 0.715 0 0
0 0.270 0.283 0
0 0 0.715 0
0 0 0 1

We can now make an interesting observation: φφ−1 is close to an identity matrix,
as is φ−1φ. Thus, after mapping from one ontology to the other, we can nearly
recover our initial information.
(5) φφ−1 =

1 0.014 0.137 0
0 0.851 0.142 0
0 0.134 0.856 0
0 0 0.001 1
 , φ−1φ =

1 0.014 0.008 0.001 0
0 0.715 0.360 0 0
0 0.270 0.276 0.283 0
0 0 0.355 0.715 0
0 0 0.001 0 1

The matrix φ represents the following function mapping the 5-state ontology to
the 4-state ontology:
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The black arrows indicate near-certainty; the gray arrows indicate probabilities
of about 12 .
If we compose φ with our utility function, we obtain a utility of 1 for the right
square and a utility of 0 for the other squares, which agrees with our intuitions.
7. Outlook
Those wishing to extend our algorithm as presented may consider what to do
when the agent’s sensors or motors are replaced, how to deal with differently-sized
time steps, how to deal with continuous models, and how to efficiently find mappings
between larger, structured ontologies.
Furthermore, there remain difficult philosophical problems. We have made a
distinction between the agent’s uncertainty about which model is correct and the
agent’s uncertainty about which state the world is in within the model. We may
wish to eliminate this distinction; we could specify a single model, but only give
utilities for some states of the model. We would then like the agent to generalize
this utility function to the entire state space of the model.
Human beings also confront ontological crises. We should find out what cognitive
algorithms humans use to solve the same problems described in this paper. If we
wish to build agents that maximize human values, this may be aided by knowing
how humans re-interpret their values in new ontologies.
We hope that other thinkers will consider these questions carefully.
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